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Abstract
Throughouttheirlife, humansoftenengageinpublicgoodsgamesinsituationsrangingfromfamilyrelated
issues to global warming. In all cases, the tragedy of the commons threatens the possibility of reaching the
optimalsolutionassociatedwithglobalcooperation. Uptonow, individualshavebeentreatedasequivalent
in all respects, in sharp contrast with real life situations, where diversity abounds. Here we discuss the
results reported in [Santos et al., Nature (2008) 454:213-6], where we show how social diversity provides
an escape from this paradox. We investigate the impact of social diversity in the evolution of cooperation
in complex networks of interaction. We show that the diversity in the number and size of the collective
endeavors each individual participates and with the individual contribution to each investment promotes
cooperation. The enhancement of cooperation is particularly strong when both wealth and social ties
follow a power-law distribution, providing clues on the self-organization of social communities.
1 Summary
One of the major puzzles faced by theoretical biologists and economists is to understand why individuals
voluntarily contribute to public goods — beneﬁts that everyone receives whether or not they contribute to
them. From collective hunting to tax paying and green policies, the mechanisms that lead to the emergence
of cooperative behavior remain a central challenge for several areas of science. The missing link between
paying and beneﬁting from a public good creates an obvious dilemma between individual and collective
goals, leading self-regarding individuals to refuse to contribute (to defect). A similar situation comes into
play whenever the same resource is commonly explored by many, in which the so-called tragedy of the
commons [2] — one of the most evocative metaphors of social sciences — is the ultimate outcome of
selﬁsh, non-cooperative behavior. Similarly, numerous engineering applications, in which decentralized
control, social learning or population based artiﬁcial intelligence are used to achieve, for instance, self-
organized task allocation, efﬁcient online adaptive systems or collective robotics applications, require a
proper understanding and control of the complex nature of self-organized cooperative behavior.
The problem of contributions to common goals, in all its different ﬂavors, dates back to the classical
writings of Rousseau, Hobbes and Hume, discussing the emergence of the social contract, a central political
and philosophical concept. Similarly, Darwin tried to understand how costly contributions could lead to any
kindofevolutionaryadvantage, givenitsapparentparadox, alsopresentinmostHumancollectiveendeavors.
If fact, even if cooperation abounds in Nature and Humans tend cooperate in many public goods dilemmas,
current theoretical studies based in (evolutionary) game theory invariably predict, and economic experiments
corroborate, that the temptation to forego the public good mostly wins over collective cooperative action.
However, up to now, individuals have been treated as equivalent in most respects, in sharp contrast with
real life situations, where diversity is ubiquitous. Similarly, in many multi-agent systems, not all agents are
equally likely to interact with each other and some interact more than others. Agents often interact along the
links of complex networks, with applications such as network routing and sensor networks. The inﬂuence
of such structures in the self-organization of cooperative systems remains unclear. In this short contributionto BNAIC’09, we report and discuss the results published in [4], where we show how diversity provides an
escape from the tragedy of the commons, and relate the conclusions with recent results recently obtained
concerning the study of other forms of social diversity.
We introduce diversity via realistic social networks [1], graphs in which individuals occupy the vertices
while the links deﬁne the group sizes and social structure of the population. This opens the possibility that
some individuals interact and are regarded as social models more often than others. Social diversity becomes
associated with the number and size of the public good dilemmas in which each individual participates, but
also with the contribution that each individual, as a cooperator, is able to offer. Behavior becomes dependent
on one’s social context and ranking, as in real life.The dilemma of cooperation is modeled as a public good
game. Here, each participant is asked to contribute a certain amount to a common pool. The sum of all
contributions is multiplied by a factor (given as input) representing how proﬁtable the collective investment
is. Afterwards, all members of the group equally share the collective proﬁt. Unlike cooperators, who will
pay the cost of contributing to the public good, free riders (defectors) will reap the beneﬁts of the public good
withoutincurringanycosts. Asusualinmoststudiesofpopulationdynamicsthatuse(aswedo)evolutionary
game theory [3] as their theoretical tool, the proﬁts accumulated from all public goods games in which each
individual participates are associated with ﬁtness values, representing their social (or biological) success.
Therefore, behaviors of individuals with higher proﬁts will be imitated more and spread in the population.
The network, on the other hand, can be rationalized in terms of the average number of connections that each
individual has, and diversity introduced by means of scale-free networks [1].
Contrary to homogeneous populations scenarios in which cooperation cannot survive, we show that the
heterogeneity associated with the variety of social positions created the social network, is able to increase
the overall number of contributions to collective investments, providing new clues concerning the mech-
anisms that supply Humans with one of the key social features responsible for our evolutionary success:
cooperation. Social diversity can turn cooperation into a dominant behavior, even in the absence of complex
community enforcement mechanisms, reputations or punishment. From a moral perspective, this increase
in cooperative behavior is shown to be particularly relevant when all contributions are perceived as a coop-
erative act, i.e., whenever the act of giving is more important than the amount given. Given the prevailing
variety of economical backgrounds within modern societies, it is encouraging that such feature may work
as an inducer of cooperative behavior. It is also shown how the interplay between cooperation and social
diversity has important implications in what concerns wealth distribution in a population, whenever one
interprets our results in a more economically oriented viewpoint.
Interestingly, our bottom line message of having social diversity as a strong promoter of cooperative
behavior has been recently supported by several studies looking at other forms of social diversity. For
instance, in [6] the authors show how diversity in learning rates (some individuals tend to learn the best
strategies faster than others) can support cooperative behavior. Similarly, in [5] we have shown that diversity
in the way one deals with our social contacts — or in the way individuals remain loyal to somebody else —,
also promotes cooperation. This is gratifying, as we also hoped from the start to foster more studies on the
advantages (or disadvantages) of having diverse and colorful, cooperative societies. A clear-cut answer may
be hard to achieve, but we are convinced that useful hints can be grasped by means of mathematical models
combined with agent-based simulations.
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